Mercer Law Review
Volume 32
Number 3 Special Lead Articles Edition

Article 10

5-1981

Safeco and Secondary Product Picketing
Joseph F. Kinman Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kinman, Joseph F. Jr. (1981) "Safeco and Secondary Product Picketing," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 32 : No.
3 , Article 10.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol32/iss3/10

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

NOTES

Safeco and Secondary Product Picketing
In NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001 (Safeco),1 the Supreme
Court held that primary product picketing at a neutral secondary retailer's place of business that can be reasonably expected to threaten the
neutral party with ruin or substantial loss is prohibited by section
8(b)(4)(i,ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).2
Safeco Title Insurance Company (Safeco) is a California corporation
engaged in the operation of a title insurance company in Seattle, Washington. s Safeco employees were represented in the collective bargaining
1. 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
2. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act 5 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976) provides in
relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to
engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees unless such labor organization has
been certified as the representative of such employees under the
provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful,
where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary
picketing....
3. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title Ins. Co.), 226 N.L.R.B. 754,
93 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1976), enforced, 99 LIR.M. 3330 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, 627 F.2d 1133
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process by the Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, Retail Clerks
International Association, AFL-CIO. 4 Negotiations between Safeco and
the union reached an impasse in November of 1974, and on November 18,
1974 the union commenced a strike against Safeco's Seattle offices.5 A few
months later, the strikers began picketing five independently operated
Washington title insurance companies that issued policies underwritten
exclusively by Safeco. 6 The five independent title companies derived
ninety to ninety-five percent of their total income from the issuance of
the Safeco title insurance policies. 7 Safeco owned varying stock interests
in each of the five Washington companiess and also had one of its own
officers serving as an officer and member of the board of directors of each
land title company.9 The Land Title Company of Pierce County and
Safeco filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (Board)
contending that the union's picketing of the title companies violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.10
The Board determined that the title companies were neutral and separate employers with respect to Safeco's dispute with the union.' The

(D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
4. The union was certified as the collective bargaining representative of Safeco employees in July of 1974. 226 N.L.R.B. at 754, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1338.
5. Id. at 755, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1338.
6. Id., 93 L.R.R.M. at 1338-39. Striking employees picketed at each of the five companies
on various dates between February 19, 1975 and April 15, 1975. The pickets requested the
public not to buy Safeco title insurance. The employees also distributed handbills that requested consumers to cancel their existing policies.
7. Id., 93 L.R.R.M. at 1339. Title searches and escrow services provided the remainder of
the revenue.
8. The percentage of stock owned by Safeco in each of the various title companies varied
from 12% to 53%. Id.
9. Two officers of Safeco serve on the board of directors of Land Title Co. of Clark
County, one of whom is also secretary of the latter company. Id. at 755 n.4, 93 L.R.R.M. at
1339 n.4.
10. Id. at 754, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1338. The charges also alleged that the union had violated
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i) (1976). The text of this subsection appears at note 2 supra. The
Board declined to rule on the § 8(b)(4)(i) allegation because neither the complaint nor the
briefs contained any facts or contentions to support the allegations. 226 N.L.R.B. at 757
n.16, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1341 n.16.
11. 226 N.L.R.B. at 756, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1340. Employers who are not neutral are allies
of the primary employer. Unions are permitted to picket allies of the primary employers
without violating the National Labor Relations Act. The factors or circumstances that the
Board considers in determining whether two or more employers are allies are: (1) the degree
of common ownership; (2) the common control of day-to-day operations, including labor
relations; (3) the extent of integration of business operations; and (4) the dependence of one
employer on the other for a substantial portion of its business. NLRB v. Local 810, Steel &
Hardware Fabricators (Sid Harvey, Inc.), 460 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041
(1972); Graphic Arts Local 262 (London Press, Inc.), 208 N.L.R.B. 37, 39, 85 L.R.R.M. 1196,
1196-97 (1973). Employers have been held to be allies by performing struck work, NLRB v.
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Board based its finding of neutrality primarily on the lack of common
control. 1 ' There had been no interchange of employees between Safeco
and the five title companies.' Despite the common officers and board
members, Safeco had no control over the labor relations policies of the
title companies, except for the Land Title Company of Clark County."
The Board held that, because of the potential economic impact that successful picketing would have had on the title insurance companies, defendant's activity violated the Act.1' Since Safeco products constituted between ninety and ninety-five percent of the secondary employer's
business, the boycott of the primary product would result in a boycott of
the secondary employer entirely." The potential and predictable economic impact that a successful picket would have had upon the neutral
title companies gave the union's efforts a prohibited objective: that of
forcing the secondary employer to cease doing business with the primary
employer." 7
The Board issued a cease and desist order, 1s which the union appealed.
A three-judge panel upheld the Board's decision, with Judge Robb dissenting. The panel reasoned that since the only other services that the
title companies provided were ancillary to the Safeco policies, a boycott
of the policies was essentially a boycott of the secondary employer. 1 ' The
Business Mach. Local 459 (Royal Typewriter), 228 F.2d 553, 557-58 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956), or when the primary and secondary employer are really a single
employer, Sid Harvey, 460 F.2d at 6.
12. 226 N.L.R.B. at 756, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1340. Even though there was evidence of economic dependence, this factor alone is not a sufficient basis upon which to deprive the secondary employer of his neutral status. Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chem. Co.),
211 N.L.R.B. 649, 86 L.R.R.M. 1381 (1974), enforcement denied, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir.
1975), vacated, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), dismissed as moot, 229 N.L.R.B. 302, 96 L.R.R.M. 1090
(1977). See also United Tel. Workers v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 827 (1978); NLRB v. Local 3, IBEW, 542 F.2d 860, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1976) and
Carpet Layers, Local 419 v. NLRB, 467 F.2d 392, 400-01 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
13. 226 N.L.R.B. at 756, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1340.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 757, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1341.
16. Id. In NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58
(1964), the Supreme Court held that consumer picketing that persuades consumers to stop
all trade with a secondary employer is prohibited by § 8(b)(4)(i,ii)(B) of the NLRA. Consumer picketing that persuades consumers to refrain from purchasing only the struck product does not violate the Act. In Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chem. Co.), 211
N.L.R.B. 649, 86 L.R.R.M. 1381 (1974), enforcement denied, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
vacated, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), dismissed as moot, 229 N.L.R.B. 302, 96 L.R.R.M. 1090
(1977), the Board held that the Tree Fruits doctrine is not applicable when the picketing is
reasonably calculated to induce customers not to patronize the neutral party at all.
17. 226 N.L.R.B. at 757, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1341.
18. Id. at 757-58.
19. 99 L.R.R.M. at 3333-34.
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panel relied upon the integrated products cases to support its reasoning.ss
The court of appeals, sitting en banc, upheld the finding of neutrality by

the Board and the three-judge panel but reversed the finding that the
picketing was illegal.21 According to the en banc court, the test is whether
the secondary picketing is closely confined to the primary dispute." So
long as picketing at the secondary site is restricted to the primary product, the same pressures would result upon the secondary employer that a
successful picket of the primary employer would have applied.2 3 The en

banc court rejected the potential and predictable economic consequences
test for determining the presence of coercion espoused by the Board and
the en banc dissents. " The en banc majority applied a strict test; picketing of the primary product at the secondary site would be permitted,

while picketing of the secondary employer would be forbidden.25 In June
of 1980, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded

the case with directions to enforce the Board's order.2 "
The problem that the lower courts had in deciding Safeco stemmed

from their differing interpretations and applications of the Supreme
Court's decision in NLRB u. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree
2 7
Fruits).
In Tree Fruits, the local union was picketing at the neutral
Safeway stores, asking consumers not to buy apples supplied by Washing-

20. Id. The integrated products cases include Local 399, United Bhd. of Carpenters (K &
K Constr. Co.), 233 N.L.R.B. 718, 96 L.R.R.M. 1575 (1977), rev'd, 592 F.2d 1228 (3d Cir.
1979); Cement Masons Local 337 (California Ass'n of Employers), 190 N.L.R.B. 261, 77
L.R.R.M. 1255 (1971), enforced, 468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986
(1973); Teamsters Local 327 (American Bread Co.), 170 N.L.R.B. 91, 67 L.R.R.M. 1430
(1968), enforced, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir 1969); and Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37
(Hawaii Press Newspapers, Inc.), 167 N.L.R.B. 1030, 66 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1967), enforced, 401
F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also Note, Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 v.
NLRB (Safeco Title Insurance Co.): Extending Tree Fruits to Protect Picketing of Predominant Product Secondaries, 74 Nw. U.L. Ray. 970 (1980) and Comment, Consumer
Picketing and the Single-Product Secondary Employer, 47 U. Cm. L. Rav. 112 (1979).
21. 627 F.2d at 1142-48.
22. Id. at 1144 (quoting Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 72):
[t]he Court [in Tree Fruits] took a very different approach in order to determine
whether picketing "threaten[s], coerce[s], or restrain[s];" the critical inquiry the
Court undertook, simply and solely, was whether the "picketing is employed only
to persuade customers not to buy the struck product." That was because, in that
event, "the union's appeal is closely confined to the primary dispute," and while
the picketing is extended to the secondary employer's premises, if the union's effort is successful the secondary employer's purchases "are decreased only because
the public has diminished its purchases of the struck product."
23. 627 F.2d at 1144.
24. 627 F.2d at 1148-51. Judges Robb, Tamm, MacKinnon, and Wilkey dissented.
25. 627 F.2d at 1145.
26. 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
27. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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ton State growers.2 The Washington State apples comprised only an insubstantial portion of each Safeway's total business.2 9 The Board determined that the picketing was in direct violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
of the Act and ordered the union to cease its unfair labor practices.8 0 The
Board held that the proscribed objectives of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) could
be inferred from the consumer picketing in front of a secondary establishment if "[t]he natural and forseeable result of such picketing, if successful, would be to force or require Safeway to reduce or to discontinue
alto''
gether its purchases of such apples from the struck employers."
The court of appeals reversed, holding that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) only
banned consumer picketing which "in fact threatens, coerces or restrains
secondary employers. 8' 2 Thus, the Act did not prohibit all secondary
picketing.8 8 Since the actual effect of the picketing did not cause a work
stoppage nor interfere with deliveries (the picketing was peaceful), the
picketing did not violate the Act absent a showing that the picketing had
resulted in or was likely to result in a "substantial economic impact '' "
upon the secondary employer.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and approved of
picketing that follows only the struck product, as opposed to picketing
aimed solely at the secondary employer himself.8 5 The Court rejected the
court of appeals' test for coercion, which had depended upon "whether
Safeway suffered or was likely to suffer economic loss. ''8s In reaching its
decision, the Court examined the purpose for the Landrum-Griffin secondary boycott provision, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The Landrum-Griffin
Amendments 7 were intended to limit the labor union's rights to exert

28. Id. at 60.
29. Id.
30. 132 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1178, 48 L.R.R.M. 1496, 1499 (1961), rev'd, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C.
Cir. 1962), rev'd, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
31. Id. at 1177, 48 L.R.R.M. at 1499.
32. 308 F.2d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1962)(emphasis added).
33. Id. at 317.
34. Id.
35. 377 U.S. at 72.
When consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers not to buy the
struck product, the union's appeal is closely confined to the primary dispute ....
On the other hand, when consumer picketing is employed to persuade customers
not to trade at all with the secondary employer, the latter stops buying the struck
product, not because of a falling demand, but in response to pressure designed to
inflict injury on his business generally. In such case, the union does more than
merely follow the struck product; it creates a separate dispute with the secondary
employer.

Id.
36.
37.

377 U.S. at 72.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub.

890

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

pressures on secondary employers who were neutral to the primary labor
disputes." The amendments were passed to close up gaps left by the
Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947.3 These loopholes allowed unions to
boycott at secondary sites in an appeal to get secondary customers to
cease patronizing the secondary employer.40 The majority in Tree Fruits
pronounced that the Landrum-Griffin Amendments did "not reflect with
the requisite clarity a congressional plan to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites. 41 Three Justices believed that the
secondary boycott provision prohibited all secondary consumer picket-

L. No. 257, 73 Stat. 519.
38. 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOsuii- AcT OF 1959, at 1568 [hereinafter cited as 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1959)]. An analysis
submitted by the bill's sponsors explained that the purpose of the amendment was to prevent unions from engaging in secondary boycotts. 105 CONG. REc. 14, 347 (1959), reprinted
in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1959), at 1522-23; 105 CoNG. Rac. 15,531-32 (1959). In adopting
subsection (ii) of the bill, the conference committee understood that the subsection would
reach only threats, restraints, or coercion of the secondary employer. 105 CONG. REC. 19,829,
reprintedin 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1959), at 1823.
Under clause (A) strikes or boycotts, or attempts to induce or encourage such action, were made unfair labor practices if the purpose was to force an employer or
other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in
the products of another, or to cease doing business with any other person. Thus it
was made an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in a strike against employer A for the purpose of forcing that employer to cease doing business with
employer B.
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Seas. 43, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT OF 1947, at 569 [hereinafter cited as 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1947)]. See also 105 CONG. REc. 17,898 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy-"The chief
effect of the conference agreement ... will be to plug loopholes in the secondary boycott
provisions of the [Taft-Hartley Act]") and 105 CONG. REc. 17,904 (1959) (remarks of Sen.
Goldwater-"The [Landrum-Griffin] bill . ..closed up every loophole in the boycott section of the [Taft-Hartley Act] including the use of a secondary consumer picket line"). Similar comments can be found in 105 CONG. Rzc. 17,908 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Curtis); Id. at
3951 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); and an address by President Eisenhower (Aug. 6, 1959),
reprinted in 105 CONG. Rac. A8488 (1959). For further discussion on the legislative history
of the National Labor Relations Act and its secondary boycott provisions, see National
Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967), and NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S.
46 (1964).
39. National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 633. The Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, § 8(b)(4)(A), 61 Stat. 141 (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4) (1976)) prohibited unions from engaging in or inducing employees to engage in a
strike to force an employer to cease doing business with another person.
40. See National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 623-27; Tree Fruits,377 U.S. at 51-54. See also
United Wholesale & Warehouse Employees Local 261 v. NLRB, 282 F.2d 824, 827 (D.C. Cir.
1960); NLRB v. International Union of United Brewery Workers, 272 F.2d 817, 818-19 (10th
Cir. 1959); NLRB v. Business Mach. Local 459 (Royal Typewriter), 228 F.2d 553, 559-61 (2d
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956).
41. 377 U.S. at 63.

1981]

SAFECO

ing," a view equally expressed by opponents of the bill," commentators,"'

and the NLRB."
In Safeco, the Court examined the merged product cases, a series of
decisions that further interpreted and applied the Tree Fruits doctrine.
The merged product rule, as announced by the Board in Cement Masons
Local 337 (California Ass'n of Employers),"4 is that "a violation of [section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)] occurs when a struck product is so merged with other
products that the only way for a customer to boycott the struck product

is to cease patronizing the picketed place of business.'

7

The merged

product rule is applied when the struck product of the primary employer
becomes incorporated or merged with a service or product of the secondary employer. In Cement Masons, the labor dispute was between a cement masons union and a general contractor. The general contractor was

engaged by the secondary employer (the owner and developer of a housing project) to construct houses. The union alleged that the contractor

employed cement masons at sub par wage standards. The constructed
houses were treated as the struck product, which resulted in a total boy-

cott of the developer's business as well. The Ninth Circuit upheld the
Board's order that the picketing was a violation of the Act.' Whereas in
Tree Fruits the picketing was addressed to only one of many items carried by the secondary employer, 4" the picketing in Cement Masons related to the only item carried by the secondary employer. 50

42. Id. at 76, 92.
43. 105 CONG. Rac. 17,882-83 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Morse); Id. at 17,898-99 (remarks
of Sen. Kennedy) (1959). However, the Supreme Court stated in Tree Fruits that it is the
sponsors of the legislation that the Court should look to as a guide for the construction of
legislation, and not the fears and doubts of the opposition. 377 U.S. at 66. See also United
States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 357 n.9 (1957); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S.
270, 288 (1956); and Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95
(1951).
44. Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1086, 1114 (1960); Cox, The Landrum-GriffinAmendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REv. 257, 274 (1959); Comment, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments: Labor's Use of the Secondary Boycott, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 724, 731 (1960).
45. Upholsterers Frame & Bedding Workers Local 61 (Minneapolis House Furnishing
Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 40, 43-44, 48 L.R.R.M. 1301, 1305-06 (1961), enforcement denied, 331
F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1964).
46. 190 N.L.R.B. 261, 77 L.R.R.M. 1255, modified, 192 N.L.R.B. 377, 77 L.R.R.M. 1825
(1971), enforced, 468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
47. 190 N.L.R.B. at 266.
48. 468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1972) (citing American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147,
152 (6th Cir. 1969) and Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB (Hawaii Press
Newspapers, Inc.), 401 F.2d 952, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
49. 377 U.S. at 60.
50. 468 F.2d at 1191.
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In the next merged products case, American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 1 the
primary product was bread produced by the American Bread Company.
The secondary employers were restaurants who incorporated the primary
product, American Bread, into their meals. Because a boycott of the
bread would expand the labor dispute to products other than those produced by the primary employer, the Sixth Circuit held that the picketing
violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)." The primary product (bread) had become
incorporated into the secondary product (meal), which resulted in a total
boycott of the secondary product and the secondary employer. Tree
Fruits would seem to prohibit such a total boycott and permit instead
only "incidental injury to the neutral [as a] natural consequence of an
effective primary boycott."5 3 Indeed, "such an expansion of [the] labor
discord was one of the evils that Congress intended 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to
prevent.""
Finally, in Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB,5 5 employees of the primary newpaper picketed restaurants that advertised in the
primary newspaper, asking the public not to patronize the restaurants.
The court of appeals inferred that the real purpose of the picket was to
dissuade customers from doing any business at all with the secondary employer.5 6 The court held that this action would effect a total boycott of
the secondary employer and, therefore, was prohibited by the 1959
5
amendments to the NLRA. 7
Congress chose protection of the neutral from this sort of disruption as
the interest more deserving of protection. Indeed, the Supreme Court so
stated in Tree Fruits when it characterized as one of the "isolated evils"
barred by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) "picketing which persuades the customers of a secondary employer to stop all trading with him." 8
Perhaps the case most similiar to the problems presented by Safeco
would be Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chemical). 9 In Dow
Chemical, the Board held that picketing of a struck product at a secondary site when the struck product represented a majority of the neutral's

51. 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969).
52. Id. at 154.
53. 100 S. Ct. at 2377 (citing 377 U.S. at 72-73).
54. Id. (citing 377 U.S. at 63-64).
55. 401 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
56. Id. at 954 n.4.
57. Id. at 957.
58. Id. at 956 (quoting Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 71).
59. 211 N.L.R.B. 649, 86 L.R.R.M. 1381 (1974), enforce~nent denied, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), vacated, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), dismissed as moot, 229 N.L.R.B. 302, 96 L.R.R.M.
1090 (1977).

SAFECO
total income would be prohibited boycotting of a secondary employer. 60
The struck product was gasoline produced by the Dow Chemical Company. The secondary employers were six gasoline stations deriving their
major revenues from the sale of Dow's gasoline. Striking employees of
Dow Chemical picketed the secondary gas stations, requesting that customers boycott only the named gasoline refined by the Dow Chemical
Company. 61 The Board applied the Tree Fruits test of whether "the picketing was reasonably calculated to induce customers not to patronize the
neutral parties ....
"6 According to the Board, when the primary product constituted most of the secondary employer's business, and the secondary employer would thereby "predictably be squeezed to a position of
duress, escapable only by abandoning Dow in favor of a new source of
supply,"63 the predictable impact satisfied the Tree Fruits test of customer inducement with an unlawful objective." The court of appeals denied enforcement of the Board's decision in Dow Chemical and instead
imposed a stricter application of the Tree Fruits requirement that picketing be limited to the struck product.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dow Chemical, but vacated the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case to the Board in view of subsequent intervening
circumstances."
The language in Tree Fruits suggesting that secondary picketing
against a neutral party was permitted as long as the picketing was directed only against the primary product could no longer apply.67 For in
Safeco, the neutral employer and the struck product had become one and
the same. The merged product cases and Dow Chemical illustrate the
critical difference between the boycotting in Safeco and the boycotting in
Tree Fruits." In Tree Fruits, the picketed item was only one of several
items being sold by the secondary employer." A successful boycott in
Tree Fruits resulted in only "incidental" damage (lost business) to the
neutral employer. 70 A response by the neutral employer would be either
to reduce orders for the struck product, or to drop the product altogether,

60. 211 N.L.R.B. at 652, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1384.
61. Id. at 649, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1384.
62. Id. at 651, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1383. See Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 63.
63. 211 N.L.R.B. at 651, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1383.
64. Id. at 651-52, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1383.
65. 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), dismissed as moot, 229
N.L.R.B. 302, 96 L.R.R.M. 1090 (1977).
66. The Respondent union was dissolved during the appeal process. 229 N.L.R.B. at 302,
96 L.R.R.M. at 1091.
67. 377 U.S. at 70.
68. 100 S. Ct. at 2376.
69. 377 U.S. at 60.
70. Id. at 72-73.

894

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

thus resulting in some economic pressure upon the primary employer.71
The Court in Tree Fruits determined this marginal injury to be an acceptable result of the labor dispute.7 Safeco concerned more than just
marginal injury to the neutral employer. As in the merged product cases
and Dow Chemical, it is entirely conceivable that the secondary boycott
in Safeco would cause financial ruin of the secondary employer. 7 In
Saleco, the title companies deal for the most part solely in the primary
employer's product.7 ' If the title companies were to "drop the item as a
poor seller" 7' they would be dropping ninety to ninety-five pecent of their
entire business. Even though the secondary picketing in Safeco "only discourages consumption of a struck product,"7 6 financial ruin of the neutral
employer would still ensue. When the neutral employers are forced to
choose "between their survival and the severance of their ties with [the
primary employer,] the union does more than merely follow the struck
product; it creates a separate dispute with the secondary employer. 7 7 According to the Court in Tree Fruits and Safeco, this expansion of a labor
dispute is one of the congressionally determined forbidden evils.7 8 As the
Board had done in Dow Chemical, the Court in Safeco interpreted congressional intent to be the protection of neutral employers when the neutral employer's business depended upon the products of the primary
7
employer. 9
As the Court noted in Safeco, the picketing situations presented in
Tree Fruits and Safeco represent two extremes of conduct that are encountered in applying section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 80 Tree Fruits concerned only
one of many products, while Safeco concerned the one and only product.
The strict Tree Fruits test of whether the picketing follows only the
struck product has been severely tempered and restricted by the Safeco
decision. Dicta in Tree Fruits could have been interpreted as supporting
the Safeco decision, long before the Safeco litigation developed. 81 Argua71. Id.at 73.
72. Id. at 72-73.
73. 100 S. Ct. at 2377.
74. Id. at 2376.
75. 377 U.S. at 73.
76. 100 S. Ct. at 2377.
77. Id. at 2376-77 (quoting Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 72).
78. Id. at 2377 (quoting Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 63-64).
79. Id. at 2377 n.8.
80. Id. at 2377 n.11.
81. All that the legislative history shows in the way of an "isolated evil" believed to
require proscription of peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites, was its use
to persuade the customers of the secondary employer to cease trading with him in
order to force him to cease dealing with, or to put pressure upon, the primary
employer .... [A] union appeal to the public at the secondary site not to trade at
all with the secondary employer goes beyond the goods of the primary employer,
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bly, the holding of Tree Fruits was applicable only to the particular facts
of the case.82 Nevertheless, the Safeco decision is a logical extension of
the Tree Fruits rationale, an extension well foreshadowed in the merged
products cases and the Board's decision in Dow Chemical. If the true import of the legislative intent was to protect neutral secondary employers
from the prohibited coercive effects of secondary boycotts, then Safeco
implements this legislative intent in a logical manner. Who could doubt
the coerciveness of a possible reduction of ninety to ninety-five percent of
one's business?
Obviously, an effective economic weapon of labor has been tempered by
the Safeco decision. A greater burden of investigation accompanies this
partially deactivated weapon. The burden is now upon the unions to determine how much of the secondary employer's business is dependent
upon the primary product. Nor has the Court in Safeco given any guidance or quantitative measures for determining how much dependency a
secondary employer must have on the primary product before the Safeco
restraint will apply. The Court itself acknowledged that it was drawing no
fine line for this determination of how much would be too much." The
Court expressed the opinion that the determination of the fine line would
be made by the Board, depending on the facts of each case." The test
that the Board is to apply is whether "the secondary appeal is reasonably
likely to threaten the neutral party with ruin or substantial loss.""
JOSEPH F. KINMAN, JR.

-and seeks the public's assistance in forcing the secondary employer to cooperate
with the union in its primary dispute.
377 U.S. at 63-64 (footnote omitted).
There is .. .nothing in the legislative history prior to the convening of the
Conference Committee which shows any congressional concern with consumer
picketing beyond that with the "isolated evil" of its use to cut off the business of a
secondary employer as a means of forcing him to stop doing business with the
primary employer. . . .[Tihe prohibition of § 8(b)(4) is keyed to the coercive nature of the conduct, whether it be picketing or otherwise.
[Plicketing which persuades the customers of a secondary employer to stop all
trading with him was also to be barred.
Id. at 68, 71.
82. "We come then to the question whether the picketing in this case, confined as it was
to persuading customers to cease buying the product of the primary employer, falls within
the area of secondary consumer picketing which Congress did clearly indicate its intention
to prohibit under § 8(b)(4)(ii)." Id. at 71.
83.

100 S. Ct. at 2377 n.11.

84. Id.
85. Id.

